Abstract: Many libertarians ground their theory of justice in a non-aggression principle (NAP). The NAP is often the basis for the libertarian condemnation of state action -that it is necessarily aggressive and therefore unjust. This approach is often criticised insofar as it defines aggression, in part, as the violation of legitimate property rights, and is therefore parasitical upon a prior -and unjustified -theory of property. While it is true that libertarians who defend the NAP sometimes fail to give a satisfactory account of its relationship to libertarian property rights, such an account is in fact available. A commitment to property rights and to non-aggression can both be grounded in a commitment to non-interference. Such a principle, then, brings together the NAP and the theory of property it is parasitical upon, thus saving the unity and austerity of the overall approach.
Introduction
In academic political philosophy, libertarians usually endorse self-ownership as something of a foundational principle.
1 Ever since G. A. Cohen's (1995) identification of self-ownership as Robert Nozick's central commitment in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) , mainstream political philosophers who criticise libertarianism usually do so by criticising self-ownership. 2 However, libertarianism as an intellectual movement existed outside of the academic mainstream prior to the publication of Nozick's seminal work, to which libertarianism owes its seat What has come to be known as the non-aggression principle (henceforth NAP) is taken to be the central pillar of both Austro-Libertarianism and Randian Objectivism, which between them encompass a large part of the libertarian intellectual movement. 5 It entails that the only natural, enforceable duty we have to other persons is that we do not aggress against them or their property. Correspondingly, the only natural, enforceable right we have is that others do not aggress against us or our property. Hence, the legitimate use of violence in society is limited to the enforcement of this duty and its 3 This need not mean they would be opposed to theories based on self-ownership, however (Long 2012b) . 4 There are two ways in which a principle can be axiomatic: by being a presupposition of a particular domain of discourse, but which depends upon prior principles outside of that domain; or by being self-evident. Here I use the term in the former sense, as did Rothbard himself. 5 Nozick attended Rothbard's reading group, the Circle Bastiat, which met at his Manhattan apartment from 1953 to 1959. Part one of Anarchy, State, and Utopia can be read as an attempted rebuttal of the anarchism he would have been exposed to at those meetings. Nozick's connection to Rand is only that Rand's reading group The Collective met for a time with the Circle Bastiat to discuss her book Atlas Shrugged (1957) shortly after its publication. However, we know that Nozick engaged with her work from his paper 'On the Randian Argument ' (1971) . He also directly engaged with Rothbard's work judging from a few notes in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974, pp. 343f ., notes) as well as other market anarchists such as Lysander Spooner, Benjamin Tucker, and Morris and Linda Tannehill. He also engaged with other aspects of Austro-Libertarianism besides anarchism (1977) . In this regard, therefore, Nozick does represent a continuation of this broader libertarian movement in that he self-consciously reappraises their work and follows in their footsteps.
correlating right. 6 Of course, other enforceable duties might be created by the consent of those whom they bind. Through contract or agreement we might take on other duties, but the power to enter contractual social relations is viewed strictly as an application of our control over our right not to be forced to do things -other than abstain from aggression (Barnett 1986; Rothbard 1998, pp. 35-50; 133-148; Steiner 2013; . Given Rothbard's and Rand's absence from the mainstream of academic political philosophy, the NAP is rarely exposed to serious philosophical scrutiny.
7 Matt Zwolinski has recently undertaken to right this wrong (2016) . 8 Though he is sympathetic to the NAP, Zwolinski argues that we ought not treat it as foundational, since it is in fact parasitical upon a prior theory of property, and thus employs a moralised conception of aggression insofar as it is always defined in terms of violations of property rights.
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If it can be shown, however, that the kinds of property rights libertarians are committed to can be justified by the same grounds as a commitment to nonaggression, then this common ground can serve the foundational basis usually ascribed to the NAP. Whilst this would shift the NAP away from an axiomatic status, insofar as it would be entailed by a more foundational principle, this latter principle would both justify the NAP and serve an axiomatic role itself, thus not compromising the content or the structural simplicity of libertarian rights theory.
I argue that a commitment to non-interference grounds both property rights and non-aggression. Whilst the NAP on its own cannot explain why we ought to think of all kinds of property rights violations as aggressive, a non-interference principle (henceforth NIP) can explain why both property rights violations and aggressions are the same kinds of wrongdoing. The NAP's invocation of preestablished property rights is therefore unproblematic, not merely because a 6 It has been argued that this implies the only just or legitimate state would be a 'minimal' one which was constrained to only enforce the NAP (Nozick 1974, pt. 1; Mack 2006; Machan 2008) . However, it has been well-argued that even such a state would necessarily violate the NAP in failing to permit persons to choose who may and may not enforce their rights, and thus, a just society would have to be a stateless one (Rothbard 1974 (Rothbard /2000 1974; 1998, chs 22ff., 29; Johnson 2008, pp. 157-169; Long 2008) . 7 Unlike self-ownership (Arneson 1992; Ingram 1994, chs. 2-4; Cohen 1995; Fried 2004; LippertRasmussen 2008; Sobel 2012; . 8 Also see his earlier essay (2013). 9 Zwolinski also argues that we ought not be 'absolutist' in our application of the NAP in real life cases; other values may sometimes, if rarely, outweigh a reasonable commitment to nonaggression, or otherwise may need to be invoked in order to inform our application of the NAP in particular cases. However, I do not engage with this claim here, but see Christmas (2016). justification for those rights is available, but because they share the same justification as a commitment to non-aggression itself, bringing them into moral harmony. It is the interfering nature of aggressions -their threat to individual agency -that is wrongful. So pivoting from the NAP to the NIP does not compromise the moral character of libertarianism, but rather enriches it.
The paper proceeds as follows: in section 2 I argue that while some libertarians do indeed treat the NAP as an axiom whilst simultaneously defining it in a way which refers to property rights without justification, this can be justified by appealing to the NIP. The NIP therefore takes over the axiomatic status thought to be occupied by the NAP, and the NAP is then an implication of the NIP. In a prepropertarian state, the NIP can ground a theory of property rights and a commitment to non-aggression. In section 3 I will quell possible resistance to this move. Zwolinski claims that (a) the NAP can only ground 'personal property' and not 'nonpersonal property', because violations of nonpersonal property rights are not aggressive, therefore using aggression in their defence violates the NAP. However, the violation of nonpersonal property rights are (where those property rights are legitimate) in fact interferences which, as such, licence responsive interference, but not aggression. Zwolinski also argues that (b) the establishment of property rights sometimes requires violations of the NAP. However, while some libertarians have argued that legitimate property acquisitions can interfere with existing uses of resources by third parties -for example, Nozick (1974, pp. 174-182) and Anthony De Jasay (1997, pp. 176ff.) -we need not.
2 Non-interference as a basis for non-aggression and property rights
Zwolinski rightly argues that the NAP -as it is usually referred to within the libertarian movement -presumes a prior theory of property, since the definition of aggression it employs includes the violation of property rights: 'on the moralized understanding of aggression, the NAP cannot serve as a foundation, since it is necessarily parasitic on a prior theory of property rights that does all the real substantive philosophical work ' (2016, p. 72) . On this interpretation, libertarians are trading on an ambiguity between the common-sense notion of aggression, and a notion which also includes violations of property rights as aggressions. When we cut through this ambiguity, what we are left with is a fairly uncontroversial opposition to aggression on the one hand, but a potentially controversial view of property rights on the other. Respect for property rights therefore does considerable normative work in shaping the content of libertarian rights theory, but under the guise of just counting as non-aggression. The NAP -as it stands -therefore cannot be as foundational as libertarians claim, since it is parasitical on a prior theory of property rights. The common understanding of aggression is, as Zwolinski notes, something akin to battery under common law: assault, threats of assault, and the forceful seizure of personal property such as a hat or a pocketed wallet. However, many violations of property rights do not look like aggression in this everyday sense. For example, taking someone's wallet, not out of her pocket, but from a park bench she left it on earlier that day; or taking a short-cut across a privately owned field. These are property rights violations, and hence libertarians want to say that the NAP prohibits them, yet they are not aggressive in the normal sense.
Zwolinski argues that, through the conceptual slight-of-hand involved in the NAP, libertarians 'are pretending that a support for property is just the same thing as an opposition to physical violence ' (2016, p. 84) . He is certainly right that we ought not consider trivial rights violations such as walking across another person's field as forms of violence. To do so would be to morally trivialise actual violence. However, there is a moral parity between aggression in the everyday sense, and violations of property rights. They are both wrong for the same reason: they are both instances of non-consensual interferences in other person's ongoing activities, just varying in degree of severity.
What I will argue here is that a commitment to non-aggression can be grounded in a broader commitment to non-interference: aggressions are particularly serious forms of interference in persons and their actions. Moreover, a commitment to non-interference can ground property rights insofar as upon initiating use of some initially unowned resource, a commitment to non-interference implies they have a right to exclude others from this resource insofar as that is necessary for their ongoing use of it to be un-interfered with. Uses of natural resources can sometimes be so expansive as to entail a very expansive right of exclusion, strong enough to resemble that which characterises private property or full liberal ownership.
Non-interference and non-aggression
Zwolinski is right in saying that our ordinary usage of aggression -the normative content of which libertarians want to trade on -is akin to the common law definition of battery: serious non-consensual interference in persons and their personal possessions. But what is interference? As the broader set of actions of
Rescuing the NAP which aggressions are a subset, we can tie down a fairly specific notion of interference. For A's actions to interfere with B's, B must already be engaged in some ongoing action (or the active initiation thereof), which A's action then alters the course of in such a way as to frustrate the ends to which the action was directed.
10 For A's actions to interfere with B's they must have the consequence of altering those objects and spaces which are subsumed into B's ongoing activities in such a way as to conflict with those activities by frustrating their intended trajectory. Note that persuasion or appeals to reason that causally result in the alterations of a person's actions do not interfere in the relevant sense because they do not get between a person and her deployment of means in the pursuit of ends. Persuading a person to alter her actions does not redirect her means, it changes her ends. As Judith Jarvis Thomson says, to ask someone not to eat a salad does not interfere with her eating the salad, though it may cause her to not eat the salad, whereas holding onto the plate so she cannot reach it does (1990, p. 53) .
Aggressions are the most morally serious forms of interference, and hence an opposition to interference entails an opposition to aggression.
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When we use someone else's land for our own purposes, we interfere with her plan for it, and hence redirect the means by which she sought her ends. Of course, this does not get in the way of her many other projects, nor does it necessarily make it wholly impossible for her to achieve whatever it was she wanted to do with this land by some other means.
12 However, when we interfere with a person's use of her body by applying force to it, this is morally a far more serious interference because it does not merely hinder her projects and redirects the means by which she pursues them, but it does so by compromising her control over her projects in the most fundamental way. One's body is the primary means by which we pursue our ends; or, more accurately, control of our bodies is constitutive of our actions. So getting in the way of a person's 'use of' her own body wholly undermines her agential capacities, where interfering in her use of land typically does not. Hence aggression (in the ordinary sense) is an interference which threatens our projects in a more fundamental way -it threatens our very ability to set and pursue projects. Where destroying someone's non-personal property 10 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to give this specific formulation.
11 Though there may of course be other reasons to oppose aggression that do not straightforwardly follow from an opposition to interference. 12 If she wanted to grow wheat to sell, she could -ex hypothesi -plant wheat elsewhere, or find some other way of making money, etc.
interferes with that particular project, aggression against one's person undermines not just one's extant projects, but one's capacity as a project pursuer. We are stopped from pursuing projects altogether to the extent that interference with our bodies takes place. 13 Likewise, our immediately personal property such as clothing and accessories while we wear them, mobile phones or walking sticks while we carry them, and bicycles or cars whilst we operate them, are so constitutive of our agency that interference with them is much like interfering with our bodies (cf. Wheeler 1980; Long 2006, p. 91; 2012a; Gillis 2009 ), hence why battery includes interference with personal property. Aggression is a kind of interference, but it is closer to the centre of our agency, and for that reason, it is a particularly serious kind of interference.
14 We can construe the NAP, then, as an implication of a broader commitment to non-interference. The virtue of identifying aggression as unjust due to (in least, part) its status as a form of interference is that non-interference can itself ground the kinds of property rights the NAP is often articulated as including the protection of -so that non-aggression and respect for property are united in one principled opposition to interference.
Non-interference and property
Ownership is often viewed as a bundle of rights held against others with regard to an object or space.
15 A. M. Honoré famously offered eleven incidents which are part-and-parcel of 'the liberal concept of ownership': the right to possess, 13 It might be thought that minor inflictions of pain are aggressive, yet do not count as interferences, thus implying that an opposition to aggression cannot be gotten entirely out of an opposition to interference. However, bodily security and being free from inflictions of pain seem to plainly be pre-requisites for free action. The kind of control over one's body which would permit one to prohibit small inflictions of pain is necessary for one to engage in activities of one's own choosing -indeed, most people's purposive activities include that they be free from inflictions of pain while they do it. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on the relation between the NIP and bodily rights. 14 I do not intend to make the strong claim that all aggressions are more morally serious than non-aggressive interferences, only that in general they are. Indeed, the stronger claim is made by Margaret Radin: that there is a bright-line distinction between personal and nonpersonal property such that the latter carries a categorically lesser value (1993, ch. 1). This stronger view is mistaken for reasons given in Penner (1995) . I am thankful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting I clarify the status of aggression as a morally serious form of interference. 15 See John Lewis (1888, p. 56) and Benjamin Cardozo (1928, p. 26) for early uses of the bundle of sticks metaphor; for critiques, see J. E. Penner (1996) and Jeanne Schroeder (1994) .
Rescuing the NAP the right to use, the right to manage, the right to income, the right to capital, the right to security, transmissibility, absence of term, prohibition of harmful use, liability to execution, and residuary character (1961, pp. 108-128) . 16 The right of possession is understood as exclusive control over that which is owned (1961, pp. 113f.) , meaning that what happens to that which is owned is wholly determined by the owner. The right of possession is therefore a right to exclude third parties. It is often thought that the right of exclusion is the essential or characterising feature of a property right or set thereof. William Blackstone famously pronounced that property was 'that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe' (1893/1753, ch. II.I, italics added).
More recently, David Schmidtz argues that ownership ought to be viewed less as a bundle of sticks and more like a tree, where the trunk represents the right to exclude, and branches representing the other various incidents (2010; 2011) . If some of the branches are cut off, there is still a tree; a different tree, a smaller tree, but a tree. If you remove the trunk, however, the tree has gone. Likewise, if one removes or weakens some of the various incidents of ownership, it is still ownership insofar as there is still a right to exclude, but if the right to exclude is removed, the ownership is gone, and all that remains is an assortment of rights, the sum of which does not amount to ownership as such.
17 Exclusion, then, is essential to ownership. How is it that a right not to be interfered with in one's ongoing activities can ground such a right to exclude others from parts of the external world? To understand how a right to non-interference can ground property rights, we need to imagine a pre-propertarian 'state of nature' in which all resources are unowned -there are no specific rights over specific resources held by anyone. Where persons have a right to non-interference, they are at liberty to use the unowned world; to subsume parts of it into their ongoing actions.
18 A use-right to unowned resources is often seen as a far cry away from a property right, or even a basis for the acquisition of property rights. However, where one initiates 16 There is general agreement that the prohibition of harmful use is not strictly an incident of ownership, since it stipulates what one cannot do with that which one owns (Waldron 1988, p. 32; Steiner 1994, p. 98; Attas 2006, p. 140) . 17 For a useful discussion of exclusion and property, see Penner (1997, pp. 68-104) .
18 The NIP describes the duties of non-interference we have to others, but these duties all correlate with rights held by those to whom they are directed, hence we each have a right to non-interference. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this clarification.
use of a resource, one does thereby acquire some right to exclude others, namely, insofar as is necessary for one to continue in one's activity unimpeded. This has often been viewed -mistakenly, as I will argue -to be a categorically different kind of right to that of ownership. The right of exclusion that accompanies a use-right can often be as extensive as it is in the case of ownership. In the picture painted by Schmidtz, the right to exclude is independent of any userights one has to the owned object. This seems to be the way Hugo Grotius understood it too -for him, the right to unilaterally use natural resources could not on its own ground private ownership. Grotius believed that, in a state of nature, each person has 'the privilege of lawfully using common property ' (1916/1608, ch. V.3) , and that once a person starts using a resource, it is unjust to interfere with her use of it.
Almighty GOD at the Creation, and again after the Deluge, gave to Mankind in general a Dominion over Things of this inferior World. All Things, as Justin has it, were first in common, and all the World has, as it were, but one Patrimony. From hence it was, that every Man converted what he would to his own Use, and consumed whatever was to be consumed; and such a Use of the Right common to all Men did at that time supply the Place of Property, for no Man could justly take from another, what he had thus first taken to himself; which is well illustrated by that Simile of Cicero, Tho' the Theatre is common for any Body that comes, yet the Place that every one sits in is properly his own. The right to use resources, and the right that no other person interfere with that use, Grotius took to be a kind of property, but not private property or ownership in anything like the full liberal sense. Blackstone exposited the Grotian view thus:
For, by the law of nature and reason, he, who first began to use [a resource], acquired therein a kind of transient property, that lasted so long as he was using it, and no longer … Thus the ground was in common, and no part of it was the permanent property of any man in particular; yet whoever was in the occupation of any determined spot of it, for rest, for shade, or the like, acquired for the time a sort of ownership, from which it would have been unjust, and contrary to the law of nature, to have driven him by force: but the instant the he quitted the use or occupation of it, another might seize it, without injustice. (Blackstone 1893 /1753 The right against interference in one's use of natural resources falls short of grounding ownership because -so Grotius thought -it did not permit one to 'recover possession' once one had physically relinquished it (1925/1625, ch. II.II. II). Only private ownership would give one such an extended right of exclusion of the things one was not in physical contact with. Whilst one has the right to exclude others from the resource whilst one is using it, insofar as is necessary for one to continue using it, one's right of exclusion goes no further than this.
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However Grotius appears to have been mistakenly taking use to only be constituted by the physical connection between an external object and a person's body (Grotius 1925 (Grotius /1625 against interference in our activities must extend beyond a mere claim against physical invasion of one's person. Indeed we can be interfered with without having our physical integrity violated, and we can have our physical integrity violated without being interfered with. A right against interference must protect our intelligible possession of things, and not merely our empirical possession.
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When one's use of an initially unowned object extends beyond one's physical connection with it, so does one's right to exclude others from it. And indeed, our use of external resources resoundingly does extend in this way in many cases.
One cannot deny 'the use that a hunter has for his bow even at the moment when it lies by his side, or the use that the philosopher has for his word processor even when he is busy cooking dinner' (Mack 1999, pp. 528f.; cf. Simmons 2001, p. 239) . Whilst there are no doubt many finer details that would need to be developed in order to have a full account of property based upon activity that cannot be sufficiently worked through here, I will offer some reasons for thinking such an account is available, and even in agreement with many of our intuitions about property.
When one cultivates crops in a field, for example, even once one has finished work for the day and gone home, one's ongoing use of the field is intelligible 19 Mathias Risse claims that, for Grotius, the use-rights each person has in the world are 'only liberty rights' with no accompanying claim rights (2012, p. 96). However, given that this liberty is accompanied by the self-sovereignty of the individual (Grotius 1925 (Grotius /1625 , ch. I.II.III), each person has a duty to abstain from interfering in the liberty of each other: 'no Man could justly take from another, what he had thus first taken to himself' (Grotius 1925 (Grotius /1625 
. II.II.II). What
Risse should have said is that there are no claim rights beyond those necessary to vest the liberty to use the world. 20 Anna Stilz parses this distinction as follows: intelligible possession is 'a form of possession that does not require us to physically hold a thing in order for us to [be] wronged by someone else's use of it without your consent' (2009, p. 42). 21 As Ralf Bader has impressed upon me, a right against physical invasion of one's possessions does not directly entail a right against invasion of one's intelligible possessions. My point here, though, is that a right against interference in one's actions must protect one's intelligible possessions (where that possession is itself non-interfering).
despite the fact one is no longer physically touching it. It looks like there is very little a third party could do with this field without interfering in one's use of it. The right to 'recover possession' (Grotius 1925 (Grotius /1625 , chs. II.II.II, II.II.VI), and therefore the right to exclude others just is the right to not have one's use interfered with, in the case of cultivating crops. Likewise, if one uses a piece of land to build a home, there are very few uses of this space that others could make without interfering in one's use of it as one's home. 22 They certainly could not demolish the house, nor walk inside uninvited and help themselves to one's possessions whilst one is out shopping, since qua home it is still implicated in one's ongoing activities in an intelligible way. 23 Inasmuch as the NIP implies duties to abstain from objects and spaces which other persons have engaged in their ongoing activities, it is a basis for the acquisition of ownership of things one uses in ways which are in fact exclusive of other uses by other persons.
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Of course, not all uses of the initially unowned resources will result in third parties having duties to abstain from them altogether. Where one's use of an initially unowned resource is not such that any use of it by another would interfere, one obtains an appropriately restricted exclusion right. Resources which are not used in rival ways thus become common property. 25 One has no 22 It might be thought question-begging to characterise the resident's ongoing use of the land as requiring privacy and extensive non-interference, as this bakes into her activity precisely what is required for acquiring ownership over it. However, it seems reasonable to suggest that norms of privacy surrounding the concept of a dwelling, residence, or home, are indeed partially constitutive of it. Whether or not such norms of privacy evolved because homes are privately owned, or whether private ownership of homes institutionally evolved because of norms of privacy, I am not qualified to say. But what is clear is that the norms of privacy are there: One cannot really use a location as a home -as we typically understand that term -if one does not have fairly exclusive and private control of it. I am thankful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this interesting discussion; sadly there is insufficient space to explore it as much as I would like to here. 23 They could of course 'use' the space by passing harmless radio waves through it for the purposes of broadcasting, but full liberal ownership is scarcely considered to give the owner the right to enjoin such harmless nuisances (Rothbard 1997 (Rothbard /1982 Harris 1986, pp. 144f.; Penner 1997, p. 72; Mack 2015) . Also see Judge Bramwell's remarks in Bamford v. Turnley (1862, at 33). 24 It might be thought that the NIP does not permit one to exclude others from, e. g. one's farm, if they are furthering one's ends in their use of it, whereas ownership ought to permit one to exclude others, even if they are helping out. It seems plausible to suggest that an essential part of individuating an activity is who and how many people are engaged in it. If one is tending to one's crops on one's own, it seems that someone else coming and assisting you without your consent changes the nature of the activity in question, and hence interfering in what you were doing before. 25 Although libertarians (and classical liberals) are often seen as defenders of private property, many see an important role for easement rights (Rothbard 1997 (Rothbard /1982 Van Dun 2009; Rescuing the NAP right to exclude others from non-rival uses of a resource (Fressola 1981, p. 320) . For example, if one walks down a hitherto unowned path to one's home, it is not the case that other persons who come and also walk along the path are interfering in one's ongoing activities. However, if this is a path one uses regularly, it does look like third parties cannot build a wall that dissects the path, since this would interfere with one's use of it (Long 2006, p. 93) . Or, if one goes fishing in an initially unowned pond, one only obtains the right to exclude others from making use of that pond in a way which would interfere with one's fishing. In such a case one could not stop others from filling pails of water from the pond, for example. 26 So in cases like cultivating land or the construction of buildings, the NIP grounds a bundle of rights roughly identical to full liberal ownership, since there is nearly nothing a third party could do with this property that would not interfere with one's ongoing use of it. But in cases where one's use leaves room for others, one acquires an easement or a right of usufruct. The NIP entails that the way in which the resource is in fact used by persons will determine the extent to which they will acquire rights to exclude others, since the nature of the use determines what constitutes interference therein (cf. Rose 1986; McKean and Ostrom 1995, p. 6) . If persons use them in ways which render additional users an interference, they will have the right to exclude additional users, where they do not, they will not, and the resource will remain open-access until they do.
There is a strong sense in which the NIP sometimes prohibits appropriation, where claiming ownership over a resource would interfere with its current use by others. 27 Whilst it justifies one's private appropriation through activities like the cultivation of land, insofar as it gives one rights against interference in other, less intensive uses of resources, it prohibits third parties from then privatising such resources -any rights they can acquire will have to be consistent with one's initial use. 28 2010, p. 80) and various forms of commons (Rose 1986; Long 1996; Holcombe 2005; Pennington 2013 ) alongside or in addition to private property in certain contexts. Also see Jason Brennan (2017) on what political philosophers can learn from Elinor Ostrom's seminal work Governing the Commons (1990) . 26 Within reason, though: draining the pond altogether would, of course, interfere with fishing. 27 John Locke famously said that one could appropriate resources through productive use so long as 'there is enough, and as good left in common for others' (1689, ch. II.V.27). Nozick was similarly concerned that a proviso was needed to protect those who are deprived of their use of resources by others' appropriations; however, the NIP never underwrites such appropriations in the first place. In this sense, we could view the proviso as built into the justification of original appropriation -the NIP -in first place. For a similar account of the proviso as being internal to the justification of original appropriation, see Mack (1995; 2002) . 28 I have restricted the discussion here to tangible property and not intellectual property. However, intellectual property rights seem to be captured by an activity-based account of By the NIP, could one not acquire vast swathes of natural resources through simple acts and which one claims are exclusive uses thereof? For example, could one not cast an eye over a landscape and claim that its use by anyone else would interfere with one's enjoyment of it? Or step onto an unoccupied continent and claim that one is using the entire thing?
29 There are good reasons to think that the NIP could not justify such acquisitions. Any system of rights must be, at least in principle, publically knowable -that is, there must be some objective criteria available to all by which to judge whether or not a person has a right or not. 30 For acquired rights to obtain in virtue of something subjective, like what the putative acquirer takes herself to be doing, would lead us into indeterminacy over who gets to use a resource in which ways -precisely the kind of indeterminacy a set of rights is supposed to avoid (cf. Steiner 1977; 1994, pp. 86-101) . If A is permitted to exclude B from interfering in actions A considers herself to be engaged in, and B is likewise permitted to exclude A from interfering in actions B considers herself to be engaged in, and both consider themselves to have engaged in the use of a given resource first, appealing to rights does not solve our problem. Indeed, the right to exclude others from what they each individually take themselves to be doing is precisely what lead to the conflict. Where the acquisition of rights depends upon the actor's subjective states, there is no external public criteria by which to verify which actor was in fact first to use the resource in question (cf. Stilz 2009, pp. 48ff.). For this reason, then, the action a person takes herself to be engaged in cannot -at least not on its own -be the basis for the acquisition of rights. Rather, it must be the action as commonly understood by the community of persons who are duty-bound to respect those rights, for which there are public criteria for when they have taken place. Just as we know that someone is greeting us when they wave at us without needing to peer into her mind, we know property rights just as tangible property. One can view an intellectual property right as the exclusive right to engage particular kinds of goods in commercial or profit-seeking activity.
Where other persons make money off one's ideas, inventions, or creations, they interfere with one's use of them for profit-seeking purposes (Cwik 2016) . Violation of intellectual property often gets in the way of their holder's pursuit of profit, so intellectual property rights can be construed as interference. Whether or not money-making is the kind of activity that can be protected by the NIP in this particular way is sadly a topic there is not sufficient space to discuss, but see Palmer (1990 ), Long (1995 , Attas (2008), and Kinsella (2008) . Also omitted is a detailed account of how property is transferable under this account of acquisition. However, it seems that one's power to consent to another person engaging in what would otherwise constitute an interference in one's actions implies the power to alienate one's claim to use the resource in that particular way, and hence to alienate the property right. 29 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this important question. 30 For various discussions of why rights must have such objective finality, see Narveson (2001 Narveson ( / 1998 Fressola (1981, p. 321); Barnett (1986); and Steiner (1994) .
the extent to which a person is using a river when we see them fishing in it, the extent to which a person is using land when we see them planting seeds in it, and hence what it would take for these activities to be interfered with, without peering into the mind of the actor. 31 There are no public criteria for distinguishing the two actions looking at a landscape and looking at a landscape in such a way that is made impossible by the sight of hikers that can be appealed to in cases of conflict, and therefore neither can ground the acquisition of a property right. Moreover, stepping onto a continent is not a way of using it, certainly not a way for which there are publically identifiable criteria by which we could distinguish it from merely taking a walk. 32 Whereas there are public criteria for distinguishing two actions sitting by the river and fishing in the river -namely, that the actor in question has baited her hook, or started assembling her rod. The NIP does not therefore permit one to acquire things purely through intending or desiring them, but only when they are in fact subsumed into one's ongoing activity in a way recognisable as such by other actors.
33
There will be difficulties in establishing which kinds of activities that persons actually engage in are sufficiently salient to ground the acquisition of rights, but we can, for now, at least make the conceptual claim that only those activities which are intelligible to other actors can ground rights against interference in those actions.
Insofar as the NIP permits one to exclude others from interfering in one's use of resources, it justifies the acquisition of initially unowned property through using it in a way that is wholly rival with any kind of use by third parties. Where one's use falls short of this, one is only permitted to exclude others from those uses which are rival with one's use, but not exclude them altogether in the way that is characteristic of private ownership. The NIP therefore offers a robust justification for the emergence of property where there are none, and hence can perform the axiomatic role within libertarian rights theory often imputed to the NAP.
34
31 Though peering into the mind of another may not necessarily help, even if it were possible (cf. Wittgenstein 1958, § 205; 1982, § § 234f.) . 32 Rothbard mockingly referred to the idea that one can appropriate a continent by stepping onto it or walking around its coast line as a 'Columbus complex ' (1998, pp. 47f.) . 33 It ought to be noted, however, that one can have a claim against interference in one's merely taking in the view of resources if one has already acquired the right to exclude others through some other, more intelligible means. 34 Although libertarians (and classical liberals) are often seen as defenders of private property against common property, many see an important role for a variety of forms of property besides private ownership such as public easements and commons (Rothbard 1997 (Rothbard /1982 Rose 1986; Long 1996; Holcombe 2005; Van Dun 2009; Schmidtz 2010, p. 80; Pennington 2013) .
Zwolinski's objections
Zwolinski gives some reasons for why we should resist the idea that the NAP (or presumably anything closely resembling it, such as the NIP) could ground property rights (2016, pp. 66-72) . Zwolinski argues that the enforcement and acquisition of property rights often violates the NAP. He says that violations of nonpersonal property rights are not aggressive in the ordinary sense; therefore using aggression to defend these property rights is initiatory aggression, in violation of the NAP. And moreover, that the establishment of property rights where there previously were none sometimes initiates aggression. For both of these reasons, Zwolinski believes a commitment to non-aggression is not a reliable basis for a robust theory of property. If Zwolinski is right and property rights are incompatible with the NAP, then they will also be inconsistent with the NIP (since aggression is a kind of interference).
Zwolinski argues that the enforcement and acquisition of property rights often involves the initiation of aggression. If he is right then the enforcement and acquisition of property rights will be incompatible with the NAP, and by implication, the NIP. He is however mistaken on both counts: he assumes that enforcement of all kinds of property rights must be aggressive, and that original appropriation can legitimately interfere with others' ongoing use of resources. Neither of these are assumptions that we must or ought to make.
Aggressive enforcement
Zwolinski rightly permits that aggression extends somewhat beyond the violation of the physical integrity of one's body, namely, the non-consensual seizure of one's personal property. Indeed, this is also included in the common law definition of battery. One's exclusive control of things like clothing, one's wallet, objects held in one's hand, or other objects closely associated with one's person seem to be protected by the NAP. However, with non-personal property, Zwolinski -also rightly -says that this is not so. If A walks across B's privately owned field, she is not aggressing against B. So for B to use aggression against A in defence of her property rights would be to initiate aggression and hence violate the NAP. However, we need not assume that all property rights can be defended by aggressive means in order for them to be real. In prohibiting aggression, the NAP permits the use of defensive aggression in the face of initiatory aggression . Likewise, the NIP permits the use of defensive interference in face of initiatory interference. A suitable means of enforcing B's non-personal property rights in her field against a non-aggressive trespasser would be to non-aggressively interfere with her act of trespass, such as blocking off her path, or by interfering with her non-personal property by compelling restitution after the fact. A property right need not be enforceable by any means necessary in order for it to be a right. 35 A theory of property grounded in the NIP does not need to include the claim that all property rights are always aggressively enforceable. Aggressive enforceability can be reserved for only those property rights violations which are aggressive.
Aggressive acquisition
Zwolinski's second reason for resisting the idea that anything like the NAP could offer a basis for property rights is that the establishment of property rights sometimes initiates aggression. He offers the following example:
John puts a fence around a piece of land that had previously been open to use by all, builds a hut, and plants some crops. John tells Henry, who had sometimes used the land for foraging in the past, that if he crosses the fence without John's permission, John will use whatever physical force is necessary and appropriate to remove him. (2016, p. 86) John's putative appropriation of this land now gives him the right to aggress against (or, at least, interfere with) Henry if and when he tries to continue using it without John's permission, this putatively gives John the right to aggress against Henry in response to a non-aggressive act. However, this is less of a reason to think the NAP cannot ground the establishment of property rights, and more of a reason to think the above case is one of illegitimate appropriation -a case of expropriation. Nozick (1974, p. 176) and Anthony De Jasay (1997, pp. 171f.) believed that resources that are previously in use by one person can legitimately be appropriated by another, provided the displaced are not thereby made worse off on net (Nozick 1974, pp. 178-182) or that compensation is paid to the displaced (De Jasay 1997, pp. 176ff.) . However, neither of these authors can explain why it is legitimate for B to push A off of a resource and thus 'appropriate' it, but not legitimate for C to then push B off of it. Why does the first comer not acquire property to rights to that which she uses? From the perspective of the NIP, John is initiating interference with Henry -he is interfering with his foraging. Since John has a duty to refrain from initiating interference in the ongoing activities of other, he has a duty to refrain from interfering in Henry's use of the site in question. At the very least, Henry has an easement right to come and use the site for foraging (cf. Holcombe 2005, pp. 12f.) which the NIP requires John to respect. Property rights can become established without aggression, and indeed they must in order for anyone to be obliged to respect them. For example, if there were a piece of land that was not in use by anyone, then insofar as John could put it to use without interfering with anyone else's use of it, he could acquire property rights in it. But the NIP protects any previous users from John's expropriation.
4 Conclusion
Libertarians often present their philosophy as simply an uncompromising opposition to violence. Thanks to Zwolinski, the claim that all that underlies libertarians' opposition to the state and advocacy of free markets is an opposition to violence has been exposed to some rigorous questioning. However, this need not lead us to a rejection of the axiomatic nature of the NAP as Zwolinski suggests. When we recognise that the opposition to aggression stems from a broader -and indeed, intuitively libertarian -opposition to interference in persons' ongoing activities, the NAP is not a conceptual slight-of-hand designed to bring in the true libertarian commitment -property rights -through the back door. Contrarily the NAP -or strictly speaking, the NIP -just is a particular account of how property rights can legitimately be established. In the context of an extra-personal world that is unowned, the NIP entails that actors can acquire property rights through their ongoing uses of parts of that world. Aggression is bad, from a libertarian perspective, for the same reasons that interference in someone's ongoing activities is bad. Person's activities extend beyond their physical bodies, and beyond their immediately personal property, and interference therein is morally deplorable enough to be met with counterinterference. Where persons' activities extend over objects and spaces over time, the claim against being interfered with just is a claim to private property, or in some cases, weaker sorts of property rights. So long as we understand the NAP 36 Inasmuch as the NIP offers a critique of many nearly-universally condemned forms of property acquisition -the enclosure of the commons and the expropriation of indigenous peoples, it offers a more plausible theory of property than a libertarianism that enshrines a 'bare' power of appropriation that permits appropriators to displace existing users. Property acquired in accordance with the NIP truly protects individuals from corporate and colonial predation, whereas the approach of Nozick and De Jasay seem to licence that predation.
to be implied a broader NIP, libertarianism really is just the uncompromising application of a very intuitive and plausible principle: do not interfere with other people.
